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THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE
LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF POST-CONFLICT 
“NEW” STATES
Michael J. Stepek*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the era of international relations ushered in by the end of the Cold War, nation-
building has become all the rage.  In a burst of Wilsonian optimism, Western countries
have sought to recreate failed states in their own image, fashioning new governmental
institutions from the ashes of violent conflict or civil collapse. These projects became
possible in a fresh environment of international consensus that has prevailed since the
middle of the 1990s. Developing improved legal institutions has been considered a
particularly important component of any state-building project and has been a primary
focus of almost all such efforts.  A new label has been created to describe exercises in
developing legal institutions, with the general rubric describing them alternately as
“rule of law” or “legal and judicial reform” projects.1  The aim of these exercises is to
fashion the legal system of the target country along principles found in the legal
systems of developed Western states, that is, to promote judicial independence, legal
transparency, civil rights, and market freedoms.2  This, it is said, will promote
economic development, political stability, and reconciliation.  To date, these efforts
have been driven by legions of international experts employed by multilateral and
bilateral development institutions, from the World Bank and the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) to a myriad array of U.N. agencies and private
contractors. 
Despite the large number of these projects, there exists a relative paucity of
published analysis of what is effective and what is not, particularly in relation to the
more sophisticated norms governing commercial relations.  Although there is a
substantial volume of material addressing both the role of and the need for legal
institutions as part of legal and judicial reform projects,3 much less effort seems to have
been devoted to just how one might develop those institutions in practice.  To some
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4. An impetus for such projects under the U.N. mandate may be traced to a 1992 Report by then U.N.
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in which he called on the United Nations to become more actively
involved in what he termed peace-building activities by addressing “the deepest causes of conflict:
economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.”  The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary General, Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on
31 January 1992, ¶ 15, delivered to the Security Counsel and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc S/24111,
A/47/277 (June 17, 1992).  The legal basis for such intervention traces its roots to Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.  See U.N. Charter arts. 39-51.  
5. This is not to say that legal and judicial reform projects do not enjoy substantial funding
commitments.  The World Bank alone financed in excess of six hundred projects relating to legal and
judicial reform projects, with other international development agencies contributing more.  WORLD BANK,
INITIATIVES, supra note 1, at 3.  Few of these reform projects, however, focus on analyzing the effectiveness
of the reform, and fewer still on commercial law in particular.  See Armytage, supra note 1, at 3; Stephen
Golub, Beyond the Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative 25 (Carnegie Endowment
for Int’l Peace, Working Paper No. 41, 2003).
6. Armytage, supra note 1, at 6.
7. Golub, supra note 5, at 38.
extent, the absence of research on the best methodologies to develop an enforceable
commercial law in post-conflict “new” states can be attributed to the newness of the
issue.  The notion that we can build new states, developing fresh new institutions where
troubled countries or regions existed before, is a product of global political
opportunity.  During the Cold War, every trouble zone became a proxy battle between
the U.S. and Soviet superpowers.  Since its end, there has been a degree of common-
ality of interests in keeping a region of the world politically stable through international
intervention.  If the United States decides to actively influence the affairs of a troubled
country like Bosnia or Afghanistan, the Soviet Union no longer exists to provide
automatic opposition.  Instead, a series of more or less cooperative partners—the
European Union, Japan, Russia, and China—may support the intervention politically,
financially, and even militarily.4  These interventions in new states have given rise to
a new aspect of the science of development economics because they allow Western
countries extraordinary leverage over domestic institutions in a post-conflict tabula
rasa political environment, in which they can impose their new ideas afresh and free
of many domestic political restraints which would otherwise be present. 
Yet this does not fully explain the seeming absence of study.  Instead, it would
appear that two much more prosaic and practical issues have constrained the particular
review of this issue.  First, such projects would appear to suffer from the very practical
limitation of funding.  Funding for these legal and judicial reform projects must of
course compete with more common infrastructure projects.  Infrastructure projects are
the most common subject of development loans because politicians can more easily
show off major construction as the fruit of their borrowing commitments.  Legal and
institutional reform projects, in contrast, are by their very nature intangible, and client
countries generally do not wish to incur sovereign debt for abstract and long-term
goals.5  The success of the reform projects that do get funded appears to be judged by
more tangible goals such as new facilities, cases heard, and other items that are
quantifiable.6  Projects that are measured by the effectiveness of the instituted reform
and by the more intangible goals of commercial law in particular are hence at the end
of the queue.  Therefore, for the most part, these types of projects must be funded by
donors rather than loans.7  Donor funds, however, are in relatively short supply, and
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8. WORLD BANK, INITATIVES, supra note 1, at 12.
9. Id.
10. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT  106-18 (2006) (discussing the importance of an independent judiciary in establishing the
rule of law in developing countries).
11. Pierre Legrand, Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory, 58 MOD. L. REV. 262,
265-66 (1995) (“[L]egal practices are very much a reflection of a given culture and of a given legal
mentalité (in the senses of the interiorsed culture).”).
12. DAM, supra note 10, at 63.
it is hard to compete for those funds against other projects which provide more
concrete results.  For example, it is much harder for the casual observer to see the
immediate benefit to an impoverished nation of spending money on developing what
is considered an already elite legal profession than on a more traditional bricks and
mortar project. 
Moreover, a project designed to create an enforceable commercial law may not
necessarily be welcomed by the political leaders in any given state.  The level of
political accommodation required for international experts to enter a client country and
execute legal and judicial reform projects is substantial.8  More importantly, there are
always political interests vested in the status quo of any legal system, and overcoming
those interests to pursue root and branch reform is extremely difficult. Any legal
reform requires compliance by a client country’s political leaders.9  If a project’s
reforms threaten their position, these leaders are unlikely to support it.  Thus, it is one
thing for the World Bank to establish numerous departments to pursue legal, judicial,
and public sector administration reform, but it is another thing entirely if those
departments cannot find willing political partners prepared to embrace such reforms
in good faith.  These partners’ positions or benefits might be jeopardized if a country’s
judiciary really became independent or if public sector corruption actually was
eliminated.   In contrast, capital injections for infrastructure improvements rarely face
such problems.  A new road network financed by the World Bank is (usually) unlikely
to undermine the political hegemony of a ruling class.  
The promotion of institutional legal reforms by the international community,
however, can be seen as a real threat to a client country’s entrenched political elites
who may have strong vested interests in preserving an ineffective status quo in which
the judiciary is complicit in suppression of political freedoms or exhibits bias towards
politically preferred commercial interests.10  Similarly, those who would be entrusted
to enforce any law—judges and lawyers—would also need to commit to the reform.
Finally, from a practical perspective, a country’s legal system reflects many features
of its political institutions and culture, and its features are often heavily ingrained.11
The idea that a country would abrogate its legal and political traditions to allow
foreigners to impose their ideas upon it from the outside is often a very difficult notion
for a Minister of Justice to swallow.12  
For all these reasons, legal and judicial reform projects focused on the
implementation or effectiveness of the reform, to say nothing of those focused solely
on commercial law, are rare both because they are not domestically politically
attractive and because international donors are not easily persuaded of their benefits.
Hence, although development economists opine that development of legal institutions
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13. See id. at 5 (“[T]he idea that institutions and especially legal institutions are crucial to the process
of economic development is now broadly accepted in the academies and in the research departments of
international financial institutions such as the World Bank.”); see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-
BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 21-22 (2004); SANJEEV GUPTA ET AL.,
INT’L MONETARY FUND, REBUILDING FISCAL INSTITUTIONS IN POSTCONFLICT COUNTRIES 7-8 (2005),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/op/247/op247.pdf; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES, supra
note 1, at 2-3.
14. See IAN BANNON, WORLD BANK, THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK IN CONFLICT AND DEVELOP-
MENT: AN EVOLVING AGENDA 3-5 (2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/
214578-1112884026494/20482669/ConflictAgenda2004.pdf (discussing the increased role the World Bank
plays in post-conflict reconstruction settings).
15. In Bosnia, the office of the High Representative was established by the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 14, 1995, Annex 10, 35 I.L.M. 75.  The leading
U.N. official in Kosovo has similar de facto powers (although the use of such powers has not been
sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council), as did the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq
from 2003 to 2004.  
16. See ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END:  BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 13-37 (2004).
17. WORLD BANK, INITATIVES, supra note 1, at 3-4 (citing examples of attempts at codifying
commercial law in new and rebuilding states). 
is an imperative component of economic growth in developing and post-conflict
countries,13 it is remarkably hard for the idea to achieve traction.  
When nation-building is conducted in a post-conflict context, it is easier of course
to find a willing client state counterpart with whom to cooperate.  If the international
community decides to intervene in a failed or new state, then its role is inevitably far
more comprehensive than for a project in an otherwise developing economy.14  It may
come into the country after a war or after foreign military intervention. As in Iraq or
Afghanistan, the country’s new rulers may be hand-picked by the international
community.  Similarly, compliance with a state-building agenda, including practical
application of the lessons of neo-institutional economics, may be a condition of hold-
ing office.  U.N. agencies may have formal powers in international law (as in Bosnia
and Kosovo),15 and the level of post-war reconstruction funds and tangible foreign
military presence might give the international community formidable lobbying powers.
These projects have been pursued in the context of peace operations and the
construction of new states,16 and some significant attempts to re-craft commercial law
have taken place.17
In order to discuss the relative merits of past attempts at legal reform in post-
conflict “new” states, it is necessary to understand more generally the relationship
between economic development and the rule of law.  Accordingly, Part II of this Essay
begins in a theoretical vein by summarizing the current thinking about how the rule of
law relates to economic development, and what the law must encompass to achieve that
goal.  Part III then focuses upon the models used in legal and judicial reform projects
to build effective systems of commercial law and how they hope to promote domestic
commerce, foreign investment, and economic growth.  Part IV then turns to a series of
generic problems such projects have encountered, and offers some observations as to
why the rule of law in a commercial context is so difficult to pursue through
international intervention in a post-conflict “new” state.  This Essay concludes by
setting out some lessons to be learned for future projects.  While this Essay is
introductory in its scope and does not seek to give exhaustive answers to each of the
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18. See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 13 (setting out a clear statement of the “state-building” agenda
of which promoting the rule of law is one component).
19. See, e.g., Gerald A. Bunting, Comment, GATT and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A
Historical Perspective, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 505, 508 (1996).
20. Id. at 507.
21. See, e.g., England Will Civilize, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1891, available at http://query.nytimes.com/
mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9C05E1D61239E033A25750C0A9639C94609ED7CF&oref=slogin
(“England and the British South African Company ma[de] [claims] declaring their want to be the
establishing of  a colony in Mashonaland looking toward ‘the progress of humanity and civilization.’”).
22. See generally Robert F. Meagher, Introduction to the United Nations Family: Challenges Of Law
And Development, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 273, 274 (1995).  The first of these institutions were the World
Bank and the IMF.  They were followed by a plethora of other multinational development banks, including
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African Development Bank, the Asian
issues raised, it is hoped that the observations offered can spur discussion as to how
those involved in future state-building attempts might focus their efforts in order to
better ensure success.  The overarching theme of this Essay is that state-building in
general, and development of an effective commercial law in particular, is a science in
its infancy and is one about which we know remarkably little.  Vastly more needs to
be learned and committed in resources.  Until that happens, the exercise of trying to
create effective commercial law, and thus promote economic development in new
states, will be a tricky and elusive goal.
II.  A MODERN THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The role of commercial law in post-war nation-building is not an issue that can be
considered in isolation.  It is a comparatively small part of a rich tapestry of research
and theory of how to promote economic development in poor countries.18  This criss-
crossing array of academic inquiries is commonly called “development economics,”
and one of the principal aims of this Essay is to locate this topic within a set of broader
inter-disciplinary themes. The thought that institutional quality is a key component to
a country’s political and economic success may seem obvious to the contemporary
reader, but that has not always been the case.  In order to understand how we reached
the current view, it is worth beginning with a brief survey of the recent history of
development economics.
Before World War II, the problem of economic underdevelopment was relatively
unexplored within international relations literature or practice because the bulk of what
we now call the developing world was colonized in one form or another by the
European powers.  Styles and motives for colonization varied.  Some colonies were
established for economic purposes and were focused primarily on extracting natural
resources or facilitating a trading network.19  Others had geo-political rationales that
focused on keeping the influence of other colonizing powers at bay.20  In some
instances, there was a desire to improve the quality of life of the subject people, often
in the name of advancing “civilization.”21  However, this was rarely the overriding
purpose of maintaining colonial possessions.  As a result, few questioned why large
tracts of the world were much poorer than the West. 
The process of decolonization after World War II and the rise of multilateral
development agencies cast new light on a relatively unexplored range of development
issues.22  As colonies became independent, many faced social and economic collapse
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Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.  Over time, these banks expanded their
activities beyond their traditional arena of physical infrastructure projects to projects under the broader
umbrella of nation-building.  Additionally, a tradition developed of establishing bilateral development
agencies within Western governments, such as USAID, the United Kingdom’s DfID, and Sweden’s SIDA.
23. Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines, The World Bank:  An Overview of Some Major Issues, in
THE WORLD BANK:  STRUCTURE AND POLICIES 10, 14-16 (Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines eds.,
2000).
24. The seminal text on development economics is DEBRAJ RAY, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (1998).
25. See PARIS, supra note 16, at 13-16.
26. The early apolitical stance of the World Bank, originally called the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development,  is evidenced in its own Articles of Agreement, which stated that “[t]he
Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced
in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned” and that “[o]nly
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions.”  IBRD Articles of Agreement, art. IV, § 10,
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf;
see also PARIS, supra note 16, at 29-30 (discussing how the World Bank did not impose economic policy
conditions on loans until the 1980s and only began to impose requirements of “good governance” on loans
following the end of the Cold War, despite its Articles of Agreement).
27. DAM, supra note 10, at 4.
28. Meagher, supra note 22, at 274.
29. DAM, supra note 10, at 22 (“Assistance for industrial development stands indicted in many eyes
by monuments of rusting steel mills or underutilized raw materials processing plants . . . .  Infrastructure
development can help if properly conceived, though toll roads and bridges that no one uses come to the
skeptical mind . . . .”).
and high degrees of poverty.  Initially, it was easy to blame these failures on latent
problems inherited from their former colonial overlords.  However, this explanation
became increasingly implausible as a justification for dictatorial systems of govern-
ment, flat economic growth, and rampant corruption.  As Europe’s reconstruction was
completed, organizations originally established to oversee post-war reconstruction of
Europe, such as the World Bank, found themselves in need of broader mandates and
shifted their focus to development problems apparent in the rest of the world.23  Thus,
the science of development economics was formed.24
Initially, development economics did not focus upon client countries’ political or
legal institutions.  The reason was that, in the midst of decolonization and in the
politically polarized environment of the Cold War, any sort of development assistance
that might be characterized as political interference or as ideologically driven was
unacceptable.25  The World Bank could not advocate free markets or democracy or else
it would have lost the participation of countries under the influence of the Soviet Union
and China, and its multilateral status would have been compromised.26  As a result, the
theory developed to fit the practice.  The first theory prevalent within development
economics was the comparatively simplistic thought that countries are poor because
they lack financial capital.  With capital injections, their economies would receive a
Keynesian boost and development would occur naturally thereafter.27  This model
suited the international development banks’ desire to lend money, but it did not work
particularly well in spurring development.  The money loaned was wasted in many
cases, and growth remained negligible.  As a result, the theory evolved into one that
required capital to be directed into projects that facilitated industrial production.  The
emphasis was placed on infrastructure, with development agencies funding roads,
airports, power stations, hospitals, and railways.28  Again, the results were mixed.29
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30. See PARIS, supra note 16, at 15-16.
31. See id. at 22, 30; John K. M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory:  Law and Development
Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 244 (2007).
32. The seminal text applying neo-institutional economics to development is DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); see also THRÁINN
EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS (1990); NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G.
MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 130-56 (1997).
33. NORTH, supra note 32, at 3-10.  It is important to recognize that neo-institutional economics
generally defines “institutions” quite broadly, so as to include “any form of constraint that human beings
devise to shape human interaction” including both “formal constraints—such as rules that human beings
devise—and . . . informal constraints—such as conventions and codes of behaviour.”  Id. at 4.  The focus
of this Essay will be the former, specifically political and legal institutions.  
34. Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: The
Experience of Central and Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 12-14, 17 (1995).
35. Developing effective institutions first is the conclusion from an overview, written by Roland Paris,
of fourteen post-war peace-building missions.  PARIS, supra note 16, at 5-8.
36. DAM, supra note 10, at 123.
However, projects of these kinds were all that could be realistically achieved in the
Cold War world of international relations without courting excessive political
controversy.30
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the capitalization of China, however,
a more politically ambitious range of development projects could be initiated.31  Just
as businesses need roads, railways, and ports, they likewise need efficient regulation,
low and transparent taxes, and fast and effective legal systems.  There was no longer
a powerful communist ideology to preclude multilateral interventions focusing on
advancement of Western economic and political goals.  A new discipline within
economics emerged, calling itself “neo-institutional economics.”32  Its central thesis
was that the quality of institutions is a direct determinant of a country’s economic
growth.33 Successful businesses are the principal engines of economic development,
and they suffocate under the weight of bad government.  If government is slow, incom-
petent, or corrupt, businesses waste their resources interacting with the administration
instead of creating jobs and wealth.  Additionally, foreign investors are deterred from
investing in a country in which they cannot engage effectively with its public
institutions.34
The most important component of a country’s institutional framework is its legal
system35 for two reasons. First, the law can be used to hold public institutions
accountable.  Where legal standards are set and there are consequences for violating
them, public institutions will have incentives for compliance that may not otherwise
exist.  Although there may be electoral accountability mechanisms by which govern-
ments can be held accountable, “new” countries arising out of violent conflict may
have highly imperfect democratic procedures in which voting patterns do not reflect
perceptions of administrative competence to any significant degree.
Second, legal institutions enable commercial partners to engage in sophisticated
transactions by creating a system of enforceable promises.36  In such a system, business
partners can be confident that a court will enforce the terms of their agreement; in a
system where these promises are not enforced, incentives to observe the bargain will
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37. Id. at 124 (“[S]ocial norms sometimes operate to make it unwise for parties in the same community
to fail to perform; severe social disapproval, even ostracism, may be the sanction for nonperformance.”).
Incentives to observe contractual promises may also be created in “repeat play” situations, in which
contractual counterparts may have future opportunities to engage, but will do so only where prior
contractual commitments have been honored.  Id.; see also NORTH, supra note 32, at 34, 123-24. 
38. See DAM, supra note 10, at 70-71, 124; NORTH, supra note 32, at 118-24.
39. See DAM, supra note 10, at 127; NORTH, supra note 32, at 55.
be greatly diminished.37  In many developing countries worldwide, this concept of
enforceable promises is poorly developed. 
There are certain recurring features of economies with poor rule of law.  One is
the prevalence of “point transactions,” which is to say that economic activity tends to
be confined to interactions in which no trust is necessary or where there is the prospect
of enforcement by immediate violence.38  Say, for example, I want to buy a book.  You
have a book for sale.  I can meet you, look at the book in your presence, and pay you
money in exchange for it, even where there is no effective legal system.  There will
never be any need for either of us to sue the other, for I can inspect the book before I
accede to the exchange, and if I attempt to abscond without payment, you can take
immediate action against me.  Without a reliable and independent commercial legal
system, however, I would not buy the book from you via mail order because if I send
the money before delivery I have no legal recourse against you if you do not send the
book back to me.  A society without the rule of law cannot fully develop mail order or
the like because these are not forms of point transactions.
Another recurring feature of societies with poor commercial law is that people rely
on family and personal connections in business transactions.  Without enforcement
mechanisms, people cannot trust strangers, so they only trust people with whom they
have close personal connections in the hope that those personal bonds will keep people
to their commercial promises.  In much of the developing world, personal relationships
are far more important in business than they are in the West.  Personal relationships of
trust take the place of impartial and enforceable dispute resolution mechanisms.39  But
this is deleterious to the economy because it significantly limits the set of people with
whom any one individual can do business.  The American consumer thinks nothing of
contracting over the Internet to purchase something from a person thousands of miles
away and about whom he or she knows nothing.  Conversely, a consumer in Cairo may
not buy anything unless it is sourced from a shop belonging to his friend or relative
because of his or her fear of being defrauded.  Because of the existence of an effective
right to recourse, the American consumer has far greater choice and pays less for the
same goods.  Concomitantly, the American entrepreneur has a far greater market for
his products because he is not confined to his personal contacts in his marketing
efforts. 
Yet another component of societies without developed commercial law is the lack
of faith in marketing and advertising by either vendor or consumer.  In “new”
countries, consumers of a product do not generally trust any representations made
about the product they are buying at least in part because there are no legal
repercussions for a vendor that makes false or misleading statements.  As everybody
shares this distrust, they do not believe what they are told in the course of a business
transaction, except what they can observe for themselves at the “point.”  Realizing this,
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40. See DAM, supra note 10, at 123-28.
41. Kenneth Dam undertakes an analysis of a number of key themes in the rule of law which promote
economic development, including contracts, the judiciary, property relations, corporations, and insolvency.
See generally id.
vendors thus spend comparatively little time or money conducting sophisticated
advertising to further expand their markets, as it is unlikely to be believed in any event.
The lack of faith in marketing and advertising has very real consequences to the
economies of developing countries.  The inability of commercial counterparts to rely
upon representations they make to one another diminishes the commercial space.
Competition is harmed because vendors of products cannot effectively distinguish their
competing wares by advertising and marketing.  Transactions are further slowed by
excessive due diligence because every representation must be individually verified.
The provision of professional services is undermined because one cannot trust what
one’s professional adviser says.  The ability to make legally binding and enforceable
pre-contractual representations is vital for business.  Living in Western societies, we
may despair of the ceaseless daily bombardment of our senses with consumer
advertising, but we ought not to complain too vociferously.  Sophisticated consumer
marketing is the badge of our relatively happy economic situation, and when we travel
to countries in which advertising is primitive we recognize this as a reliable indicator
of a deep undercurrent of economic malaise.
There exists as such a direct relationship between economic activity and
commercial law, with economic activity being severely fettered by bad or unenforce-
able law.  Thus, measures to improve commercial law are an imperative component to
any plan for economic growth.  These measures expand markets, dissolve the restric-
tions imposed on commercial activity by business cultures based upon personal
relationships, open opportunities to strangers and foreigners, and allow for sophisti-
cated temporally-extended transactions using loans, deferred payments, and future
commitments.40  In contrast, all of this is foreclosed for the participant in a commercial
culture without rule of law.  All a participant can use as a locus for commercial activity
is the point transaction, involving immediate cash payments in exchange for immediate
goods or services without any future commitment by either party.  These are some of
the most important reasons why effective commercial law is important in the legal
architecture of new states.  
This completes a brief survey of the latest academic thinking about the role of
commercial law and economic development.41  For the purposes of this Essay, it is
important to recognize that this thinking has not developed in a vacuum.  It is an
academic theory about economic development arising from the political opportunities
to practice it and the desires of practitioners of international development to reinvent
their jobs when the conventional roles of the U.N. and the international development
agencies are under attack in the post-Cold War world.   This school of thought is born
not of a trial and error process of learning from prior theories, but from a desire to
meet a new growth industry of state-building within international relations.  Notwith-
standing the beguiling simplicity of the theory, the practice of successfully applying
it will be far more difficult than one might at first imagine.  To investigate just how
difficult it is, we shall now turn to the question of what makes a system of commercial
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42. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKET 87-97
(1996).
43. These problems have been well documented and include: abnormal litigation delay (even simple
cases may take years, involving multiple procedural steps that continue without end); excessive procedural
complexity in simple interactions with the government (registering companies and land transfers and
procuring urban planning consents are some of the most common problem areas experienced);
accompanying corruption in legal transactions (procedural complexity can be overcome only when irregular
payments are made); corruption in the courts (both amongst judges, who may take money to decide cases,
and amongst lower court staff, who may be persuaded to lose court files or certain papers within them, or
place them to the back of the pile for listing hearings); lack of familiarity by judges and lawyers with
concepts prevalent in international commercial transactions and lack of experience of complex commercial
disputes; excessive legal formalism, entailing a preference by judges to decide cases on the basis of
technicalities rather than substance and a habit in legislative drafting of focusing on procedural steps but
ignoring declarations on substantive issues of law; judicial bias against foreigners or in favor of those with
political connections; poor enforcement of court decisions (the process is often slow and procedurally
confusing, giving a debtor ample opportunity to move assets to evade enforcement); immaturity of
legislation (laws are often drafted vaguely, being impossible to interpret definitively and making even
simple business decisions based upon a clear understanding of the legislation difficult); poor legal training
(lawyers are incapable of clear legal analysis or practical advice); corruption or other unethical behavior
within the legal profession (a party’s lawyers may be taking payments from other parties to a transaction
or a dispute behind the client’s back or may draw a party into a transaction only to create excessive fee
demands that the client must satisfy or be left stranded); burdensome business regulation (for example
environmental, banking, or employment regulation).  See Jonathan R. Hay et al., Privatization in Transition
Economics:  Towards a Theory of Legal Reform, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 559, 560-62 (1996) (describing
many of the characteristics of a dysfunctional legal system, using Russia as a case study).  This places a
foreign investor at a competitive disadvantage with local companies, who pay bribes to those who would
otherwise enforce it. But such evasion techniques may not be available to foreign investors, who may not
have the personal contacts to know how to pay the necessary bribes, and may be prohibited by the
legislation of their home countries from making corrupt payments. 
44. See PARIS, supra note 16, at 173-75.
45. See generally EMIL BOLONGAITA, KROC INSTITUTE, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION IN POST-CONFLICT
COUNTRIES (2005).
law a good one.  We will then ask how people have so far gone about trying to create
such a system within new states.
III.  THE HISTORY OF LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECTS
Within the practice of development economics, a distinct sub-discipline of “legal
and judicial reform” focuses primarily on  reforming  a country’s legal regime,
including commercial law, into an independent and workable system.42  Once again,
the findings of development economists are relevant to this inquiry.  The legal
problems besetting businesspeople exist to differing degrees in almost every emerging
market and are remarkably consistent across the developing world.43  They tend,
however, to be particularly acute in the context of “new” states which have recently
emerged from destructive civil conflicts and painful separations from broader unions.
Often such countries have inherited a legal system from a prior imperial or federal
power.  The process of conflict, however, may have left the legal system defunct, as
it may have been run by a social or ethnic group or political elite that is no longer
dominant within the new state.  Expertise and political stability within the system thus
may have been lost.44  Moreover, corruption tends to be particularly rife in post-
conflict environments.45  In the course of a civil war-like conflict, the entire social
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46. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), SUSTAINING POST-CONFLICT ECONOMIC
RECOVERY:  LESSONS AND CHALLENGES 3 (2005) (“[T]here are certain commonalities that can be found
to some degree across the different categories of post-conflict states.  These include: economic regression,
the deterioration of infrastructure, social decay, disintegration of governance mechanisms and processes,
and institutional degradation.”); see also BANNON, supra note 14, at 33-34.
47. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), supra note 46, at 3-4.
48. See generally INT’L CRISIS GROUP (ICG), RULE OVER LAW:  OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY IN BIH  (1999); INT’L CRISIS GROUP (ICG), FINDING THE BALANCE:  THE
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49. One should also note that many of the same problems exist in the highly developed legal systems
associated with the Western world.  A foreigner who has experienced the full gamut of satellite and
appellate litigation in complex commercial disputes in the U.S. or English legal systems, might have plenty
of cause to complain about inordinate delay and unforeseen cost.
50. See generally WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW
(Fred B. Rothman 1995) (1924).
51. See supra Part II.
52. See Daniel Klerman, Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic Development 1,
4 (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C06-1, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=877490.  At least one econometric analysis also lends some support to this inquiry,
demonstrating a high correlation between enforcement of legal codes with per capita GNP.  See DANIEL
fabric will typically break down.  The omnipresent danger in day-to-day life causes
people to ignore legal rules, save to the extent that there is immediate enforcement
down the barrel of a gun.  Legal institutions thus simply collapse, with even the most
basic norms of property ownership and civil liberties ignored, let alone the more
sophisticated legal principles governing commercial transactions.46  At the same time,
a new political and commercial elite may arise out of the conflict.  This class will
include militia leaders, profiteers, and warlords who in no way feel bound by the
constraints of law and who have no experience in a legal system.  Illicit private
fortunes are amassed in the course of virtually every conflict.47  In the end, the position
of the educated middle class elites has often been undermined.  Many have fled the
country, and those who remain have had to compromise with the criminal classes that
have taken over.  This disease affects the legal system in particular, with corruption
and political pressures dominating the courts and other legal institutions.48  Civil
conflict is devastating to the rule of law in general and the orderly conduct of
commerce in particular.49
It seems that in most cases the evolution from an immature legal system to a
developed modern system of legal institutions was a gradual one that accompanied—
and to a great extent was driven by—economic growth.50  This point is worth
emphasizing, for it presents a significant theoretical challenge to the legal and judicial
reform project advanced by neo-institutional economics.  Development economics has
identified a correlation between the maturity of legal institutions and economic
development.51  However, in advancing their methodology of improving legal institu-
tions as an engine to economic growth, have development economists correctly placed
the relationship of cause and effect?  A contrary hypothesis might be that economic
growth is the driver of improvements in legal institutions because the growth creates
a politically influential business class that has a vested interest in seeing legal
institutions improve.52  If this is the principal determinant of the improvement of a
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53. European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/1/93 REV 1 (June 21-22,
1993), available at http://ue.ev.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf.
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55. James H. Anderson & Cheryl W. Gray, Transforming Judicial Systems in Europe and Central Asia,
in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 329, 332 (François Bourguignon
& Boris Pleskovic eds., 2007). 
56. Bulgaria and Romania can be said to share two legal traditions.  The first of these traditions is based
on the Roman civil law tradition, and the second is that of the socialist-transition legal family that emerged
from the Soviet Union and its breakdown.  See generally Mathias Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law
country’s legal system, then is development economics placing the cart before the
horse in seeking to create improvements in a country’s legal system before the
economic growth that will make those improvements sustainable?  As with many such
paradoxes, the truth may be symbiotic, with the direction of causation flowing both
ways.  We shall return to this thought a little later in this Essay, but now we shall focus
on attempts that have been made previously. 
There exist in particular two thematic situations in which legal and judicial reform
projects that include commercial law have been embraced and funded: (1) the case of
accession candidates for the European Union and (2) “new” states that have been
subject to unusually intensive levels of international intervention.  For E.U. accession
candidates, the countries have no choice.  The European Union requires every
candidate country for membership to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, and, for
candidates in the post-conflict western Balkans, to sign an “association agreement” at
an early stage of membership negotiations, which is essentially a checklist of institu-
tional reforms that must predate a formal decision on membership.53  Teams of
inspectors will visit the country regularly throughout the accession process, which may
take several years.  During that time, they will report to the European Commission on
the pace of institutional reforms that have been completed.  Legal and judicial reforms
are thus an integral component of E.U. membership.  Members must have a dynamic
market economy, secured by adequate legal institutions that enforce the dictates of
E.U. law.54  This requires a domestic legal system with some sophistication because
E.U. law is a complex federal system of jurisprudence that cannot sit atop an immature
domestic legal system in which judges and lawyers do not have a sound grasp of
international, federal, and constitutional legal principles. 
So far, the political imperative within the countries of Eastern Europe to join the
European Union has been so strong that it has overridden vested interests within the
domestic legal systems, and the type of large-scale external interference that legal and
judicial reform requires has been tolerated.  The funding to do this has generally been
provided by E.U. grants.  This process has been undertaken everywhere as the
European Union has expanded eastward, but the most notable recent examples have
been Romania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria, where extraordinary reforms have been made
in just a few years.55   However, these states generally share a commercial law jurispru-
dential heritage, with foreign concepts grafted on more recently.56  
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60. See PER BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA:  INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITION AND DEVELOPMENT CO-
OPERATION 91 (2006).
61. For example, Tanzania’s commercial court was established in 1999 as a subdivision of its High
Court but with distinct procedures and judges.  Dory Reiling, Court Specialization or Special Courts? A
Toolkit for Development, http://home.hccnet.nl/a.d.reiling/html/court%20specialization.htm.
62. The establishment of separate commercial courts has been the subject of some criticism.  Where
one part of a country’s court system is significantly better than other parts, litigants fight to get into that
court.  In addition to overloading the better court, this situation creates satellite jurisdictional litigation and
pressures to distort the jurisdictional rules (something found in the United States with federal diversity
jurisdiction).  The extraction of the best judges and court staff into a commercial court might also erode the
The other category of countries, more relevant to this Essay, for which substantial
legal and judicial reform projects have been implemented is post-conflict countries, or
“new” states.  These states have been subject to such heavy degrees of international
intervention that reform projects have been imposed on them.  In Bosnia, for example,
large quantities of new domestic legislation have been written by foreigners.57 
International actors have restructured the court system, appointed judges, and changed
the legal system radically.58  One of the goals of doing this was to create a completely
new commercial environment within which businesses can operate in order to
encourage economic growth in these previously devastated countries.59  Domestic
politicians and judges have had no practical choice but to accept this forced assistance
because the client country is awash with foreign troops, foreign money, and forceful
diplomatic presence.  These exercises in nation-building have been full-blooded in
their neo-institutional ambitions. 
These projects in “new” countries have typically been structured to identify a
series of very practical problems that have made the legal system ineffective at
resolving civil disputes between private individuals.  The faults perceived are often
much the same in whichever country the practitioner operates, and the practice of legal
and judicial reform has become somewhat standardized. The usual model consists of
the following components:
(a) Delays are often ascribed to a lack of courts with basic equipment. There may
not be enough courthouses or courtrooms.  Existing facilities may be inadequate.
Thus, projects are conceived to construct courts and equip them adequately.60
(b) Connected with this thought, it has sometimes been proposed to establish a
separate commercial court within a country’s legal architecture, with standards
of efficiency and independence, and with relatively few connections to the
broader judicial system.61  In this way, the wheels of commerce may be oiled by
an effective commercial dispute resolution system, even while the rest of the
country’s court structure seeks to catch up.62
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quality of the remaining judicial system.  Id.
63. See BERGLING, supra note 60, at 96 (discussing donor-initiated interventions to remedy specific
technical problems).  
(c) Efforts are often made to reform the methods by which case disposal rates are
counted.  Judges have an interest in appearing busy, and so they typically count
their caseloads using metrics such as the number of hearings completed rather
than the number of cases concluded.  This creates an incentive for repeated
adjournments (something to which inquisitorial systems of litigation may in any
event be prone) and thus creates delay.  Once a more rational data collection
system is adopted, these perverse incentives disappear.  Benign incentives can
also be created by measuring and publishing mean case disposal time (writ to
settlement or judgment) per judge.
(d) Once more rational case management data is available, it often becomes apparent
that the organizational structure of the courts is lopsided, with uneven
distribution of resources in proportion to demand.  One court might have a high
concentration of cases, whereas another court in a neighboring administrative
division may have very few even though the number of judges and other staff
assigned to the court might be the same. The solution put forth in such
circumstances is to reorganize the administrative structure of the courts and
allow transfer of cases to permit a more even distribution of work.
(e) Because courts are often beset with time management problems, judicial case
management systems are introduced.  For example, a case management system
might require that a hearing date be listed as soon as a writ or other originating
process is issued, or that lawyers be required to introduce time estimates for
hearings.  Judges might be given clerks to assist them with their caseloads, and
case files might be computerized in the form of hearing timetables.
(f) Judges and other court staff are given training on efficient case management, the
salary and incentive structures for judicial staff are analyzed and improved, and
judges are taught to undertake management roles.  A president of a court should
measure the productivity of his or her judges and other court staff using the
revised efficiency metrics. 
(g) Often attempts are made to grant judges political independence through reform
of the judicial appointment system, introduction of judicial tenure (i.e. providing
that judicial appointments are permanent until retirement, and judicial salaries
may not be reduced), and insulating the budgets of courts and other legal
institutions from the broader political processes of setting public budgets.
(h) Legal training is introduced for law students, legal practitioners, and
parliamentarians.  They are taught the skills of legal drafting, professional ethics,
and legal analysis, with the aim that legislation becomes clearer, more
transparent, and easier to apply.
(i) Modern commercial legislation is drafted, improving commercial laws, civil
procedure rules, and codes of professional ethics.
(j) Simple bureaucratic tasks are made easier by removing the number of steps
required to register a company, open a bank account, or register a transfer of title
to real estate.  Punitive taxes that are imposed upon certain types of government
interaction (particularly transfers of real estate) are reduced or removed.63
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66. Golub, supra note 5, at 23.
These are the building blocks of legal and judicial reform of the commercial law of
developing states.  Now we turn to examine the extent to which they have been
successful.
IV.  PROBLEMS WITH LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECTS
Comprehensive legal and judicial reform projects have generally been unsuccess-
ful in post-conflict states.  Although there are some exceptional success stories,
research shows that many reform projects have failed.64  This Essay delineates some
overwhelming challenges for legal and judicial reform projects in new states, such as
Bosnia and Kosovo, and explains why these projects have not achieved their goals.65
The first major challenge reformers face is themselves: they must recognize and
attempt to overcome their own limitations.  Consider the incentives of the officials who
undertake law reform projects.  Typically, they are employees of one or more private
development contractors specializing in such work, working within a budget set by an
international development bank or an international development institution such as
USAID.  Whereas the desired results of such projects are inevitably long-term, the
contracts that are actually executed tend to be relatively short-term, typically with a
time frame of one to four years.  The contractors therefore work to identify deliverable
results by which their performance may be assessed.  This context affects the focus of
the effort.  As a result, the more politically difficult tasks facing any legal and judicial
reform project—such as achieving the political consensus necessary to pursue far-
ranging reforms, changing the way judges are appointed, addressing corruption and
bias, severing the court system from politics, and radically restructuring court
procedure and administration—often go unaddressed in favor of those tasks involving
infrastructure such as building courthouses.66  
It is difficult to make international contractors address the underlying political
challenges because their results are more difficult to measure, whereas the successful
completion of a new court building is a simple, concrete accomplishment that is easy
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2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/09/azerba12177_txt.htm.  It is interesting to note that the
President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, is a lawyer and holds an LL.M. from Columbia Law School.
70. CHANDLER, supra note 57, at 3, 63-65 (discussing the difficulty of sustaining long-term success
in Bosnia absent continued foreign involvement).
71. See generally id.  In the case of Bosnia, the High Representative was not intended originally to have
executive power.  In the absence of effective local leadership, the powers were expanded at the Bonn Peace
Initiative Conference in 1997.  See OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, PEACE IMPLEMENTATION
COUNCIL (PIC) BONN CONCLUSIONS (1997), available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_ id=
5182#11 (discussing the conclusions of the conference in relation to the powers of the High Representa-
tive); see also INT’L CRISIS GROUP (ICG), ENSURING BOSNIA’S FUTURE:  A NEW INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY (2007) (suggesting that the European Union take the lead in long-term
international efforts to establish reform and self-sustaining institutions).  A full collection of the decrees
of the Office of the High Representative can be found on its website.  See Office of the High
to present in an annual contractor’s report.  Contractors must demonstrate progress to
international diplomatic officials, whose opinions might affect whether that contractor
can renew his or her mandate or secure a follow-up contract or project in another
country.  Thus, the emphasis is on constructing and equipping new court buildings,
arranging training courses, and drafting legislation, for these results are quicker to
achieve and easier to measure.67 
The incentive problem is compounded in many cases by the fact that donor
countries view legal and judicial reform projects as a desirable sign of progress and
development of a political agenda.68  Perceived success of a project then becomes a
political imperative irrespective of actual results, and projects that fail because of
frustrating political climates are often hailed as successes even when they are not.
Bosnia and the Republic of Georgia are telling recent examples of this trend.  In
Georgia, a major U.S.-sponsored rule of law project continues notwithstanding the
near-complete subservience of the judiciary to an authoritarian executive;69 in Bosnia,
a new state court institution was created by the international community, but persists
only with enormous injections of foreign manpower (including foreign judges) and
capital that are unsustainable in the long term.70
Another major challenge for reformers is the lack of effective coordination and
management, especially in new states where international intervention is intense.  Legal
reform projects have been largely successful in Eastern European candidates for E.U.
accession because they have been managed by pre-existing national government
institutions.  Government ministers at the most senior levels want the project to work
because they have a direct political interest in securing a positive report from the
European Union. But this direct incentive does not apply in the context of wide-
ranging international missions of the sort found in Bosnia and Kosovo.  In such cases,
the domestic officials submit to a government strategy created by international officials
such as Bosnia’s High Representative or Kosovo’s Special Representative of the
Secretary General.71 
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72. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP (ICG), BOSNIA:  RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY 2-3 (2001)
(outlining the principal international organizations involved in peace implementation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina). 
73. See Michael G. Karnavas, Creating the Legal Framework of the Br‡ko District of Bosnia and
Herzegovina:  A Model for the Region and Other Postconflict Countries, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.  111, 113 n.19
(2003)  [hereinafter Karnavas, Legal Framework] (outlining the international composition of the Steering
Board of Bosnia’s Peace Implementation Council); Michael G. Karnavas, Br‡ko Law Revision Commission:
Chairman’s Final Report 26, 57 (Dec. 31, 2001), available at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/
BLRC_ChairmansRep.pdf. 
74. Karnavas, Legal Framework, supra note 73, at 131.  Karnavas notes:
The lack of an overall strategy, coordination, and cooperation within the OHR is the single
greatest contributor to the lack of any meaningful or sustainable legal and judicial reform
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By outsourcing to international organizations or depending on
nongovernmental organizations to produce a coherent and consistent body of legislation, the
OHR has, in essence, subcontracted its mandate, and, as a result, placed itself at the mercy
of these international and nongovernmental organizations, which, far too often, disagree
with one another or are engaged in pursuing their own agendas.  It should not be surprising
that what is often produced is a hodge-podge of drafts that are usually met with skepticism
at best and disdain at worst by national experts.
Id. 
The biggest single problem for international intervention missions is their lack of
legal or political accountability.  Nobody elects the U.N. officials who run such
missions.  These officials write their own reports, evaluate their own successes, and
rarely ask or face difficult questions.   As a result, diplomatic imperatives may take
over.  A plethora of international organizations competing for the same political space
further complicates the scenario.72
Bosnia’s experience best illustrates the confusion and failures resulting from
competing international organizations.  Post-war Bosnia underwent probably the most
ambitious legal reform efforts ever undertaken.  The reform players included the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), USAID, the World
Bank, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the U.S., Austrian, German, and
Norwegian governments, the European Union, and countless other governmental and
non-governmental organizations.73  Domestic commercial actors and foreign investors
were rarely consulted.   It is an unfortunate, albeit understandable, fact that inter-
national officials generally talk more to one another than to the people who would
ostensibly benefit from the reforms.  The result is that there are too many people
managing the process, creating myriad overlapping and sometimes inconsistent policy
initiatives.74  Because problems of this kind are so prevalent in every state-building
attempt, it is tempting to conclude that they are an inevitable externality of employing
international organizations.
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Inevitably, short-term mandates of international officials undermine their incentive
and ability to assist stable long-term reform.  As discussed, it is normal for inter-
national contractors to stay in one country for a relatively short period—a few years
at the maximum.  The hardships involved in living in a developing country—parti-
cularly a post conflict “failed state”—result in a regular turnover of staff.  It is often
the case that not long after a contractor acquires knowledge of the local political and
legal culture, he or she departs the country.  This lack of country-specific experience
amongst the implementers of legal reform projects inevitably hinders project execution.
This can be a crippling problem to the project because if one does not understand the
politics of the judiciary, one will never understand the limits of what can be achieved
and how to achieve it.  Without a comprehensive understanding of the domestic legal
culture—including drafting styles, methods of legal argument, legal traditions and
hierarchy, the practice and strategy involved in civil procedure, domestic business
conventions, relationships between lawyers and their clients, the interaction between
business and politics, and the ways commercial people deal with problems of
bureaucracy and corruption—one can only achieve limited success in reforming that
culture.  One can spend a lifetime learning about another culture’s legal system.
Efforts at institutional tailoring will be subject to manipulation by domestic actors with
their own vested interests because they will understand the complexities of the
domestic system far better than the inexperienced international intervener.  It is a
common experience of international officials that while certain types of reform are easy
to push through, others are frustratingly hard, or even impossible, to achieve.  Still
others, when adopted, are rapidly subverted to preserve the status quo ante.75  This is
often because international officials do not understand the underlying political
considerations motivating the local actors.  The temptation for those executing legal
and judicial reform projects is to assume that the problems and the solutions are the
same in each country.  To a superficial observer, the problems with emerging market
legal systems often appear very similar.  To a person with detailed knowledge of the
particular legal culture, however, the difference appears in the subtly different balance
of political powers within which one needs to work to execute effective change. 
This lack of detailed local knowledge often encourages off-the-shelf solutions to
legal and judicial reform.  “Legal transplants” is the label given to using foreign laws
as the basis for new legislation.  Although much decried in the literature,76 legal
transplantation is a persistent practice because it is human nature for people to default
to that with which they are most familiar.  In this case, it is entirely natural for one to
use legal systems and precedents with which he or she is most familiar.  Thus, when
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leadership).
78. See generally Sienho Yee, The New Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L.
176, 180 (1996).
79. Br…ko is an autonomous region of northern Bosnia subject to special international oversight after
the end of the Bosnian war due to its strategic significance.
80. Gregory Mounier, ESDP Police Missions: From Security Sector Reform to Externalisation of
Internal Security Beyond the Borders 16 (draft paper presented at the Thirty-First Annual BISA
Conference, University of Cork,  Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://www.gregorymounier.eu/resources/
Gregory+Mounier+BISA.pdf.  Contra Karnavas, Legal Framework, supra note 73, at 123 (“[T]he primary
inspiration for replacing it came from the Swedish system, and, to a lesser extent, the German system.  The
court/trial procedure was inspired by the criminal procedure used in the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia.”).  It is difficult to reconcile the different accounts as to the source of the Br…ko
Code of Criminal Procedure except that it appears clear that whatever the source, it contained elements at
odds with the legal tradition there.   See Dr. iur. Manfred Dauster, Judge, State Court of Bos. and Herz.,
Address at George C. Marshall Center Conference:  Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Western Balkans 3 (June 20, 2007), http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-mc-index-
1/xdocs/conf/conferences-current/static/xdocs/conf/static/2007-conferences/0721/0721_Dauster_Paper.pdf
(discussing the flaws of the “Anglo-Saxon novelties” in the procedure law).
81. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:  AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 10 (2007). 
82. Id. at 4; JERRY DUPONT, THE COMMON LAW ABROAD:  CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL LEGACY OF
THE BRITISH EMPIRE, at xvii (2001).
83. It is common for foreign legal officials to perceive ambiguities in domestically drafted legislation
that do not exist in the mind of a domestically trained lawyer.  Western legal systems generally have a
international contractors draft domestic legislation, they have a common habit of using
models from their home countries.  For example, the constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was drafted by American lawyers77 and exhibits a drafting style
remarkably similar to that of the U.S. Constitution.78  When the new criminal procedure
code of the Br…ko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina79 was drafted, it was a
translation of the State of Alaska Code of Criminal Procedure; not surprisingly, Alaska
was the home state of the Chairman and Executive Director of the Br…ko Law Revision
Commission.80  There is nothing new to any of this, and it is a tradition as old as
colonialism.  Probably the most influential French export ever was its Civil Code,
adopted in various forms through colonial imposition in Louisiana, Spain, Latin
America, Africa, Germany, Prussia, and beyond.81  The English common law became
similarly pervasive throughout the British colonies, replacing pre-existing domestic
legal systems in their entireties.82  Legal transplants are attractive because they require
far less effort than getting to know another country’s legal system—something than can
take a lifetime.  Once drafted and adopted, these transplants can be hailed as a quick
success.
However, legal transplants either assume a clean legal slate from which to begin,
rather than a highly developed pre-existing legal tradition, or require a time period in
which the pre-existing legal tradition can be supplanted.  In the instance of a pre-
existing legal tradition, the new transplant is almost always a poor fit with what went
before and often assumes an entirely different system of training and method of
practice.  Foreign legal officials are often unfamiliar with domestic legislative drafting
styles and techniques of interpretation,83 which, when applied to the transplant draft,
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tradition of literalism that leads one to believe that if the answer is not in the text, the text itself is
ambiguous.  But in many so-called “less developed” legal systems, the answer to an ambiguity is obvious
by the political context because the law is a tool to achieve a certain (unstated) political end.
84. See Dauster, supra note 80, at 3 (“From my own forensic experience as a judge at the State Court
of Bosnia and Herzegovina I found out that in particular procedure legislation of 2003 contains a lot of
flaws and inconsistencies, which shall be removed the sooner the better.”).  
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It was prepared in English by American lawyers and agreed to under extreme military and diplomatic
pressure at the Dayton Accord peace negotiations hosted by the United States at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995.  It has never been ratified by any of Bosnia’s many legislatures.
The sense of local ownership was thus nonexistent.  See Opinion of the European Commission for
Democracy Through Law on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of
the High Representative, Council of Europe Doc. No. CDL-AD(2005)004, (adopted Mar. 11, 2005),
available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-AD(2005)004-e.pdf.
Due to its being part of a peace treaty, the Constitution was drafted and adopted without
involving the citizens of BiH and without applying procedures which could have provided
democratic legitimacy. . . . [I]t constitutes the unique case of a constitution never officially
published in the official languages of the country concerned but agreed and published in a
foreign language, English.
Id. ¶ 6; see generally CHANDLER, supra note 57; RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR (1998). 
86. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design:  Proposals Versus Processes, Prepared for
the Kellogg Institute Conference, Constitutional Design 2000: Institutional Design, Conflict Management,
and Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century (Dec. 9-11, 1999), http://kellogg.nd.edu/events/pdfs/
Horowitz.pdf (providing a narrative of his own participation in a domestic commission charged with
preparation of the electoral system for Fiji).
may produce a result quite different from that intended.  Once international contractors
depart and domestic lawyers are left to their own devices, old habits re-emerge and the
legal transplants are rapidly rejected by their hosts, often with detrimental conse-
quences that are worse than if the intervention had never occurred.  For example, the
attempt to introduce adversarial litigation procedures in the Br…ko district in Bosnia
degenerated shortly after the departure of the scheme’s progenitor.84 
In the worst cases, when domestic traditions of legal interpretation differ signifi-
cantly from the transplanted traditions, judges and lawyers simply ignore the
transplanted legislation or intentionally misinterpret it in order to achieve certain
political goals.  The Bosnian Constitution has suffered terribly from this malaise, as the
conditions of its drafting and implementation have put its overall effectiveness and
legitimacy in serious question.85  The most successful instances of international partici-
pation in legislative drafting have been ones in which the process is driven by local
experts who invite international guidance on their own terms in an extended
consultation process,86 rather than the transplant models in which legislative reform is
driven by outsiders with only cursory participation by domestic parties.
A more fundamental problem is that most legal and judicial reform projects have
a flawed theoretical underpinning.  Reform projects usually assume that the main
problem is an absence of technical competence.  Following from that assumption,
reformers might further assume that the reason there are heavy delays in the court
system is that judges have not thought about how to properly arrange their case loads;
that the reason laws are ambiguous is that teaching in law schools is inadequate; or that
the reason judges make poor decisions is that they have bad laws and bad training.
Such assumptions are rarely true.  “New” states do not emerge from a vacuum.  In
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nearly every country, lawyers form an elite class of highly educated and intelligent
people.  If there is no tradition of legal analysis in a country, it is often because
analytical skills matter relatively little in that country’s practice of law.  In such states,
other factors—such as political connections, familial connections, and knowledge of
how to work a corrupt system—matter far more.  In such a country, ambiguously
drafted legislation might be intentional and not the result of any poverty of legal
training.  Deliberately vague legislation in such a context allows judges and other legal
decision makers discretion in applying the rules in order to achieve their goals.  
There may be a logic, however, to the dysfunction of developing world court
systems.  For example, while Western commercial law systems exist to serve the
interests of a powerful, independent commercial class which desires to be free of the
influence of politics and government, new states lack such a powerful interest group.
Such a class might never have existed, or if it had, the commercial class might not have
survived the conflict from which the new state arose because commercial resources
were captured by a wartime political elite.  The legal systems often existed to serve the
interests of a powerful political class with strong commercial connections, who used
political and legal institutions as a tool to promote their own pursuit of wealth and to
prevent the influence of competitors, including foreign investors.  In countries where
the dividing line between politics and business is far hazier than in the West,
particularly where there is a recent history of communism, legal systems have evolved
with very different goals in mind.  A mere technical effort can never hope to reverse
the philosophical differences that have developed within the legal profession in such
a country.  More than any other type of development assistance, legal and judicial
reform is a political project. 
V.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
This Essay developed the theme that comprehensive and radical legal reform as
part of state-building has been driven by the politics of major powers and has been
implemented by uncoordinated international organizations.  Most legal reform projects
are flawed because their theoretical assumptions are invalid, their local knowledge is
minimal, and their project models strive for simplistic measurements of success.
International officials in charge of intervention projects usually believe that the
domestic legal systems they are reforming are simplistic and deficient, leading them
potentially to overlook highly sophisticated systems.  Local systems generally serve
local interests; they might favor the political and commercial elites rather than the
interests of politically neutral businesspeople—a group of minimal size, if it exists at
all, in a new post-conflict state.
Though difficult, legal reform projects are not impossible.  This Essay began with
a brief exposition of neo-institutional economics.  The neo-institutionalists remain
correct: the accessibility of an impartial legal system is important to economic
development. Without an impartial legal system, business will inevitably remain
localized, closely associated with politics, and purely national.  Foreign investors will
not come to a country in large numbers if they cannot rely on the legal system and are
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likely to lose their investments should their political connections turn sour.87  If one
wants to develop a country’s commercial system, it is important to separate commercial
and political interests.  Modern commercial systems rely upon a general proposition
of equality before the law.  Bias within public institutions condemns those without
special connections to become second-class citizens and denies a great part of the
population the benefits of commercial freedom and economic growth.  The proper
objective of a legal and judicial reform project is therefore the creation of a judiciary
independent of politics and answerable instead to a constituency of independent
commercial actors.  Contracts must be honored, property rights must be secure, and
independent judicial decisions must be enforced.88  This is more than a purely technical
matter of changing rules, laws, and the structure of court administration.  Instead, legal
and judicial reform requires a sea change in political attitudes, exemplified by the
transition from communism to E.U. membership in the accession states of Eastern
Europe.  There must be a real political will at the highest level to achieve true reform.
This suggests that the wide-ranging legal reforms sought in many post-conflict
“new” states, such as Bosnia and Kosovo—not to mention cases such as Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Cambodia—may be unrealistic in the short-term.  Legal reform is
desperately important in a post-conflict country.  One of the gravest scars of violent
conflict is the absence of almost all rule of law after the society has been ravaged by
corruption and its commercial resources have been captured by wartime military and
political elite.  International contractors cannot hope to come in and renovate the legal
system of such a country in just a few years, and thereby rapidly push open the doors
to commercial development and foreign investment.  As discussed previously, legal
transplants in this context almost never work.  Legal reform is a project that must be
home-grown by lawyers who are trained in the details of the pre-existing system and
are familiar with the political complexities of the model one seeks to reform.
Moreover, senior politicians with ideological commitment to promoting a sound
economy must stand behind the project.  They must understand the importance of
pursuing these reforms, they must publicly state that they are behind them, and they
must get involved in achieving their implementation.  Likewise, businesspeople, both
domestic and international, should be invited to participate.  The process must be
undertaken gradually and by those with a long-term interest in the country’s economic
development. 
Part III of this Essay stated that development of commercial law in Western
countries was a response to demands made by the existing commercial sector rather
than an attempt to create an infrastructure from which commercial law could develop.89
One overriding lesson about the historical development of the rule of law in Western
cultures is that legal systems must adapt to the needs of businessmen in forging free
commercial transactions—a true Lex Mercatoria philosophy.  This lesson is in danger
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of being lost.  Sustainable legal reform requires drawing long-term domestic political
imperatives from the private sector.  So far, the operational models necessary for this
type of intervention have not been developed, and little progress has been made to this
end.  There has been relatively little analysis of how best to develop and implement
judicial and legal reform, particularly in relation to commercial law, and there is no
central repository of information on past attempts from which one could develop a
coherent model.  As a result, those seeking to implement legal reforms as part of the
legal architecture of new states cannot rely on lessons learned from past attempts and
do not appear to fully understand how to best achieve their laudable and necessary
goals.  Instead, each attempt at legal reform starts anew in patchwork fashion with
predictable results.  Given the importance that the development of commercial law
plays in the stabilization and success of post-conflict “new” states, it is important to lay
a proper foundation for this development by creating a judiciary independent of
politics, and answerable instead to a constituency of independent commercial actors.
